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Argument 
I. Utah's "Going and Coming" Rule Specifically Excludes 
Claimant from Its Provisions 
The Claimant in this case is entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits. The "going and coming" rule, as refined 
by the Utah courts is not a bar to these benefits. The Utah 
version of the "going and coming" rule is narrow and specific in 
its application. 
As a general rule, an employee is not deemed to be 
within the course of his employment for workmen's 
compensation purposes when he [(1)] furnishes his own 
transportation and [(2)] is injured while going to or from 
his place of employment. 
Higgins v. Industrial Comm'n, 700 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1985) 
(emphasis added). The present appeal is very simple. The 
Claimant was using an employer-provided vehicle, not his own. 
Under the terms of the Higgins rule, the Claimant is entitled to 
worker's compensation benefits. In light of this simple rule, it 
is somewhat difficult to understand Respondent's remark that 
1 
"[t]his is simply an incorrect statement of the law." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 9. Notwithstanding Higgins, Respondent 
seeks to rely upon Utah State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 
685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984) • 
A review of Utah State Tax Comm'n, however, reveals that the 
Court never quite recited the "going and coming" rule. Instead, 
the Court states: 
The purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act is to 
protect employees who sustain injuries arising out of their 
employment by affording financial security during the 
resulting period of disability. To give effect to that 
purpose, the Act should be liberally construed and applied 
to provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the right of 
compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured 
employee. 
The Act provides that every employee who is injured in 
an accident "arising out of [and] in the course of his 
employment wheresoever such injury occurred" shall be 
compensated for resulting losses. From that rule of blanket 
coverage, courts have fashioned an exception, sometimes 
known as the "coming and going rule," which denies 
compensation for injuries suffered on the way to and from 
work. Whether or not the injury arises out of or within the 
scope of employment depends upon the particular facts of 
each case. The injury has been held compensable where 
transportation was furnished by the employer to the benefit 
of the employer; where the employer requires the employee to 
use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the business; where 
the employee is injured while upon a "special errand" or 
"special mission" for the employer; where ingress and egress 
at place of employment are inherently dangerous; and where 
the employee combined pleasure and business on a trip, and 
the business part predominated. 
State Tax Comm'n/ 685 P.2d at 1053 (emphasis added). The court 
recognized the rule of blanket coverage and the liberal 
construction to be given to the Act, stated the existence of the 
"going and coming" rule, described its effect, and enumerated a 
number of exceptions to the "going and coming" rule. Not until 
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the following year, in Higgins, did the Utah Supreme Court 
explicitly state the present Utah "going and coming" rule. 
The rule of Higgins has recently been explicitly quoted by 
this Court. In Cross v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 
824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Utah Court of 
Appeals quoted the rule from Higgins and characterized it as 
"[t]he well established rule." Notably, the Court, after quoting 
Higgins's language, also cited Cherne Constr. v. Posso, 735 P.2d 
384 (Utah 1987), State Tax Comm'n, Barney v. Industrial Comm'n, 
506 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1973), and Bailey v. Utah State Indus. 
Comm'n, 398 P.2d 545 (Utah 1965), all as support for the rule of 
Higgins. 
The rule in Higgins requires, that to deny worker's 
compensation benefits under the "going and coming" rule, the 
Claimant must have been injured while driving his own vehicle to 
or from work. In Higgins/ Cherne, and Cross the reviewing court 
found that there was no reason to deviate from the "going and 
coming" rule because the Claimant was injured driving his own 
vehicle. In State Tax Comm'n, Bailey, and Barney, the court 
found that, for various reasons, the "going and coming" rule was 
inapplicable. 
In the present case, the Higgins rule is determinative. The 
Claimant was not driving his own vehicle, rather he was driving 
the Employer's vehicle. The vehicle was provided as part of the 
Claimant's compensation. R. at 30-31. The Employer limited the 
use of the vehicle and paid for the maintenance. R. at 17-18, 
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30-31. Finally, the Employer paid for the fuel, including fuel 
consumed during the commute to work. R. at 18. The rule of 
blanket coverage should be applied to this case and the Claimant 
should be awarded worker's compensation benefits. 
II. Employer Had Control Over the Petitioner's Use of the 
Vehicle and Received a Benefit from the Arrangement 
In the present case, the Employer expressly limited the 
Petitioner's use of the vehicle in question. The record 
demonstrates that the Employer instructed the Petitioner that the 
vehicle was for business use only and forbade personal use of the 
vehicle. R. at 16, 34-35. The Employer further testified that, 
while stopping on the way home from work for dinner may not be an 
item of significant concern itself, there was concern because the 
line between business and personal use was vague and the Employer 
wanted the truck used specifically and only for business use. R. 
at 34-35. The Employer pointedly stated that using the vehicle 
for a personal trip to Park City would be unacceptable. R. at 
34. These controls and limits on the Claimant's right to use the 
vehicle were established by the Employer and communicated to the 
Claimant. R. at 30-31, 34. 
In the face of this testimony, the Employer now flatly 
suggests that while "it had the 'right to control' [Claimant] 
while he was engaged in his employment[,] [t]hat right to control 
did not extend to time spent in transit to and from work." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. This contention is inconsistent with 
the testimony presented by the Employer at the hearing of the 
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matter. R. at 30-31, 34 (forbidding all personal use of the 
vehicle). At the hearing, the Employer stated that deviations 
from the prescribed use of the vehicle were intolerable. Id. 
The Employer reserved the right to control the Claimant in his 
use of the vehicle at all times and to limit the use of the 
vehicle. It is the right to control, not the actual exercise of 
control that is the critical element. Pinter Constr. Co. v. 
Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 309 (Utah 1984). Mitchell v. Rice, 885 P.2d 
820, 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Moreover, since the Employer explicitly forbade personal use 
of the vehicle, only business use was allowed. The Employer 
evidently included commuting to work within its definition of 
business use. In addition, the Employer clearly expected the 
Claimant to bring the vehicle to work each day as it was required 
for the daily work projects. The Employer acknowledged that the 
vehicle was safer at the Claimant's home than at the Employer's 
office. R. at 35.x Additionally, the vehicle was a vital part 
1. Respondent claims there was never any evidence of 
vandalism at the Employer's premises. The Claimant's supervisor 
actually testified, under questioning from his own attorney: 
Q: All right. With respect to any vandalism, did you ever 
have a problem with vandalism when you kept the trucks 
down there at the Triad Center? 
A: Nothing to any big extent. There would be, like he 
[Claimant] said, the transients would come in and sleep 
in them and things like that. But any big vandalism, 
no. 
R. at 32-33. Under questioning from the Claimant's attorney, the 
supervisor testified: 
Q: Was there any thought in your mind about the vandalism 
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of the equipment necessary to complete the day's work. R. at 12, 
23-24, It had to be driven to the Employer's workplace; the 
Claimant had no choice. R. at 9-10, 12, 16, 23-24. 
The Employer states, in its brief: 
[Claimant] was given the option to use the company truck for 
his commute. This courtesy was merely offered to the 
employee as a benefit in lieu of a raise in pay. The 
employee could have chosen to reject or accept this benefit 
and still maintain his position of employment. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 16-17 (emphasis added). Curiously, 
Respondent fails to provide a citation to the record in support 
of the underlined sentence. The reason no citation is provided 
is because there is no evidence in the record to support the 
assertion. 
The Employer stated that providing the vehicle to the 
Claimant was to be a "benefit" to the Claimant and was in lieu of 
higher wages. R. at 30-31, 34-35. The Employer received a 
significant and substantial benefit from this arrangement. The 
Employer performed, or paid the Claimant to perform, maintenance 
on the vehicle at its shop. R. at 17-18. The Employer, rather 
than the Claimant, paid the expenses of fuel for the vehicle, 
including fuel for the Claimant's journey from home to work. Id. 
when you had Mr. Vanleeuwen take the truck home? 
A: As we was [sic] discussing the benefit as far as his 
raise increase and the fact that he was a full-time 
foreman and everything, we were talking about the 
truck, it was a new truck, we were just picking it up. 
And we says [sic], you know, it probably would be safer 
at your [Claimant's] home than parked down here, you 
know, you never know. So there could have been, yes. 
R. at 34-35. 
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A valuable managerial employee was secured for a lower payroll 
cost. R. at 30-31, 34-35. The vehicle was safeguarded at all 
hours and the Employer felt the vehicle was safer. R. at 35. 
These actions of the Employer demonstrate the importance the 
Employer attached to the journey and the benefit it gave to the 
Employer. 
Under the "going and coming" rule, Utah courts have been 
directed to consider both the benefit the Employer receives as 
well as the Employer's right to control the Claimant. Whitehead 
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989). In 
the present case, the Employer had exclusive control over the 
Claimant's use of the vehicle; the Claimant had no independent 
right to use the vehicle in any other manner than what the 
Employer proscribed. Moreover, the Employer benefitted 
substantially from this arrangement. Given the benefit to the 
Employer and the Employer's control of the use of the vehicle, 
worker's compensation benefits should be awarded to the Claimant 
in this case. 
III. The Employer-Conveyance Doctrine Is Applicable 
Professor Larson identifies, inter alia two separate 
exceptions to the "going and coming" rule applicable to this 
case. The first is where the journey to work is a part of the 
employment. The second is known as the employer conveyance rule. 
"In the majority of cases involving a deliberate and 
substantial payment for the expense of travel, or the provision 
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of an automobile under the employee's control/ the journey is 
held to be in the course of employment." Arthur Larson, WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION, § 16.31 (1991) (emphasis added). Larson then cites a 
number of supporting cases.2 Larson notes that the basis for 
this rule "depends upon the relative importance of travel as part 
of the service performed; the supplying of cash or cars is 
evidence of the status of the journey as part of the compensated 
employment." Id. at § 17.10. Thus, in the present case, the 
Employer provided the vehicle as well as the fuel, R. at 18; the 
vehicle was provided pursuant to an express agreement between the 
Claimant and the Employer regarding Claimant's wages, R. at 30-
2. Professor Larson cites a Utah case in support of this 
proposition, Hafer's Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 526 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1974). In Hafer's, the Employer provided the Claimant with 
a vehicle to use. The Claimant was a traveling salesman. In 
preparation for a sales trip the next day, the Claimant took the 
car to a service station to be checked. The car was placed on 
the rack and while the Claimant himself was attempting to work on 
the car, a spring-load shock absorber came loose, struck the 
Claimant in the head, resulting in a claim. The Employer sought 
to disavow coverage, arguing that the Claimant was beyond the 
scope of his employment in working on the car. In rejecting this 
contention, the Court stated: 
It is to be conceded, as the plaintiff contends, that doing 
mechanical work on an automobile is not normally regarded as 
part of the duties of a salesman. Nevertheless, the scope 
of one's employment includes not only those things which are 
the direct and primary duties of the assigned job; but also 
those things which are reasonably necessary and incidental 
thereto. 
Id. at 1189. On this basis the Court upheld an award of 
benefits. In the present case, the Claimant was involved in 
activities which were reasonably necessary and incidental, and in 
fact the subject of explicit agreement between the Claimant and 
the Employer. He was traveling to work in the Employer's 
vehicle, which had been provided in lieu of higher wages. 
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31; and the Employer limited and controlled the Claimant's use of 
the vehicle, R. at 34-35. Accordingly, the journey to work 
became a part of the compensated employment of the Claimant. 
The employer-conveyance exception leads to the same result. 
Larson states M[w]hen the journey to or from work is made in the 
employer's conveyance, the journey is in the course of 
employment, the reason being that the risks of employment 
continue throughout the journey." .Id. at § 17.00. The rationale 
for this rule is that the Employer has, by his own choice, 
expanded the scope of employment under his control. In the 
present case, the Employer has carefully limited the Claimant's 
use of the vehicle. The Employer has carefully maintained 
control over the Claimant's activities while using the vehicle 
and thereby expanded the scope of employment. This was done for 
the Employer's own benefit: to retain a valuable managerial 
employee for a lower cost. 
Under either rule, the result in the present case is 
identical. The vehicle was provided pursuant to an express 
agreement. The Employer maintained control of the vehicle and 
instructed the Claimant regarding permissible uses of the 
vehicle. The Employer, for its own purpose, provided a 
conveyance to the Claimant and therefore, the Claimant should be 
awarded benefits under the Act. 
IV. Case Law From Sister States 
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The Respondent makes much of distinguishing facts of each 
case from Utah's sister states. However, the Employer seems 
curiously unwilling to discuss the legal rules established by 
these cases. The Employer treats each cited case as a fixed 
point, having no vector or velocity, it is important to 
understand the rule of law established in each case in addition 
to the peculiar facts of each case. 
In Hansen v. Estate of Harvey, 806 P.2d 450 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1990), two employees were injured when the vehicle in which they 
were riding overturned, id. at 450-51. Neither employee was 
driving the vehicle. The employees collected worker's 
compensation benefits in Washington, where the accident occurred, 
and then attempted to sue their employer in tort in Idaho. Id. 
at 451. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the employees could 
not sue in tort because of the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. Id. at 452. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court stated: 
Generally speaking, an accident is deemed not to be in the 
course of employment if it occurs while the employee is on 
his way to work and has not yet reached the employer's 
premises, or while the employee is on his way home and has 
left the employer's premises. . . • [An exception to this 
rule exists] when the employee is "going and returning in 
some transportation facility furnished by the employer." 
Id. at 451-52. The Idaho Court of Appeals then noted that the 
"sole material fact" was whether the Claimants were "riding in 
employer-provided transportation." Id. at 452. The present 
appeal is no different. The Claimant was riding in an employer 
provided vehicle when he was injured. Significantly, the Idaho 
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Supreme Court affirmed the Idaho Court of Appeals decision, and 
noted that it represented the majority approach. Hansen v. 
Estate of Harvey, 806 P.2d 426, 431 (Idaho 1990). The Idaho 
Supreme Court also noted that providing compensation for injuries 
sustained while within an employer-provided vehicle furthers the 
underlying goals of the worker's compensation system of 
Mconstru[ing the act] liberally in favor of worker's compensation 
coverage of claimants." Id. at 431. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has also recognized a similar 
rule. "[I]f an employer provides transportation to its employee 
or pays the employee's cost of commuting to and from work, then 
the scope of employment broadens to include the employee's 
transportation." Maryland Cas. Co. v. Messina, 874 P.2d 1058, 
1063 (Colo. 1994), citing Loffland Bros, v. Baca, 651 P.2d 431 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1982). This rule is applicable to the present 
case. The Employer and the Claimant reached an agreement that 
the vehicle would be provided in lieu of higher wages. The 
Employer paid for all maintenance and provided the Claimant with 
a credit card to purchase fuel, including the fuel consumed 
during the commute to work. The scope of employment thus 
broadened and benefits should be awarded for the injuries 
sustained by the Claimant. 
The rationale for this rule is simple: the Employer has 
exercised dominion over the trip and has demonstrated that the 
commute is something in which he desires to be involved. The 
present case is illustrative. The Employer wished to retain the 
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Claimant as an employee at a lower payroll cost. The Employer 
accomplished this goal by providing a non-payroll benefit, i.e., 
a vehicle and fuel, to the Claimant for the purpose of travel to 
and from work. To say that the Employer received no benefit from 
this arrangement simply begs the question why the Employer would 
provide the vehicle and pay the fuel costs for the Claimant. It 
also ignores the facts of the case. The Employer benefitted by 
gaining and maintaining control over the Claimant's commute and 
by retaining the Claimant's service for a lower payroll expense. 
V. Petitioner Has Not Failed To Marshall the Evidence 
Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to marshall the 
evidence in this appeal. Respondent states "Petitioner is 
directly contending that the ALJ's factual determination that the 
employer did not benefit from Vanleeuwen's use of the truck and 
did not have control over the vehicle at the time of the 
accident." Respondent's Brief, p. 7. A review of the ALJ's 
findings of fact, which were prepared by Respondent's counsel and 
evidently not submitted to Petitioner's prior counsel, reveals 
that no such factual findings were made.3 
3. Additionally, much of Respondent's complaint stems from 
the inadequacies in the Findings of Fact, which Respondent 
produced. The Findings of Fact hopelessly confuse factual 
findings and legal conclusions. See Note 1, in Petitioner's 
Brief-in-Chief. The document fails to set forth adequate 
subsidiary facts to demonstrate the true basis for the ALJ's 
decision. A review of the document prepared does not allow the 
reader to determine how subsidiary facts support and compel 
ultimate factual findings. See, Commercial Carriers v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 888 P.2d 707, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Moreover, it is the peculiar structure of the Findings of 
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Paragraph 3 of the Findings provides: 
The Court finds that the Applicant was not under the control 
or supervision of the Defendants at the time of the accident 
and, in fact even if he had been, deviated from such actions 
by violating the traffic control device. 
ALJ Order, attached as Exhibit B to Petitioner's Brief-in-Chief. 
There is no dispute that Petitioner was driving the vehicle, and 
was alone, at the time of the accident. No one else was in 
physical control of the vehicle. However, the question of 
whether a right to control exists, or of legal control, is a 
question of law not a question of fact. Moreover, the issue to 
be resolved is a question of law: was the Claimant within the 
course of his employment when the accident occurred? 
It is difficult to understand the Respondent's complaint 
regarding the "considerable time and expense" to which it has 
been put because of the alleged failure to marshall the evidence. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 7. The entire record on appeal is a 
hearing transcript of 49 pages, the Findings of Fact prepared by 
Respondent, and the Industrial Commission's two page order. 
There are several orders of magnitude of difference between the 
brief administrative record in the present case ( and the 
voluminous record ordinarily produced in trial litigation. 
Fact which cause this confusion. The Respondent first set forth 
a five page summary of hearing testimony, and then set forth 
"findings of fact." The findings of fact are flawed and the 
actual subsidiary facts are presented in a queer manner. 
However, these facts are not challenged. It is the legal 
conclusion, that the Claimant was not within the course of 
employment, that is challenged here. 
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The Respondent's complaint regarding marshalling of the evidence 
is therefore misplace and disingenuous. 
VI* The Respondent's Parade of Horribles Does Not Exist 
Finally, the Respondent raises the specter that awarding 
benefits to the Claimant will destroy the worker's compensation 
system. The Respondent argues facts that were neither present in 
the record nor presented to the lower finders of fact: 
If the employee is deemed to be in the course of employment 
merely because a car is furnished, regardless of the fact 
that no control is retained and no benefit is received by 
the employer, two things will occur. First, workers 
compensation will move one step closer be forcing employers 
to become a general insurer of all its employees from any 
injuries they receive regardless of when they occur. 
Second, small businesses, such as Custom Landscape, which 
cannot afford to give higher pay will abstain from providing 
other "perks" in lieu of pay raises. This will serve only 
to hurt both employers and employees. 
Make no mistake, but that Petitioner is seeking a 
definite expansion to the existing worker's compensation 
system. Such an expansion is solely the province of the 
legislature, and should accordingly be left to that branch 
of the government. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 30. This passage presents facts that are 
contradicted by the record. As pointed out above, the Employer 
did retain control over the use of the vehicle. The Employer 
communicated plain and clear limits on its use and so testified 
at the hearing. The Employer received a benefit from this 
arrangement. 
The suggestion that requiring Employers to provide workers 
compensation coverage for injuries sustained in the course of 
14 
employment forces Employers to become their employees' general 
insurer is ludicrous. The Employer testified that the Claimant 
might have used the vehicle in a manner beyond the scope of 
employment, such as consuming alcohol in the vehicle or taking it 
to Park City. Injuries occurring as a result of such acts would 
clearly be without worker's compensation coverage. This is not a 
case about a slipping in one's bath tub and blaming the employer. 
It concerns a close and substantial nexus between the injury and 
the employment; a nexus close enough to justify coverage. 
Furthermore, to suggest that requiring coverage of such 
incidents will drive small businesses out of business is also 
wrong. There is no evidence of Custom Landscape's size or 
economic condition; Respondent is simply arguing facts not in the 
record. This argument is misplaced. A judicial decision is 
based upon the facts of the case and judicial precedent not 
unsupported supposition. 
Finally, Respondent suggests that this case represents a 
concerted and radical expansion of the worker's compensation 
system which the courts are unfit to do. This case is not about 
expanding the worker's compensation system. This case concerns a 
determination that a particular employer's method of compensating 
his employees implicates the workers compensation coverage. The 
question presented by this case is whether an injury sustained by 
an employee while operating an employer-provided car pursuant to 
an agreement with the employer is within the scope of employment 
and gives rise to worker's compensation benefits. 
15 
Conclusion 
The Employer and the Claimant reached an agreement• The 
Employer would provide a car in lieu of higher wages and pay for 
its maintenance and fuel. The Claimant could use the car for the 
commute to work, but was not to use it for personal use. The 
commute to work was therefore considered by the parties to be 
"business use." The Claimant was using the vehicle for the 
agreed purpose, at the proper place. Workers compensation 
benefits should be awarded to the Claimant for his injuries. 
DATED this 21st day of April, 1995. 
Brad C. Smith, Attorney for 
Claimant 
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